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Crime, Punishment, and Criminal Procedure

POISONING FOR PROFIT:

THE MAFIA AND

TOXIC

WASTE IN

AMERICA. By Alan A. Block and FrankR. Scarpitti. New York: William Morrow & Co. 1985. Pp. 361. $17.95.
Toxic wastes and the Mafia represent two of the most cancerous
elements - pervasive, seemingly without cure, causing sporadic outbursts of suffering and death - in contemporary American society.
Independently, each can evoke reactions of fear, anger, and frustration
in anyone desiring healthy and peaceful conditions in this country.
That these two terribles enjoy a growing interdependence should give
one pause. In Poisoning for Profit, Alan A. Block1 and Frank R.
Scarpitti 2 argue that organized crime's deep involvement in illegal
toxic waste dumping warrants heightened attention by the public and
those entrusted with protecting the public welfare.
The book begins by refuting the notion that illegal toxic waste
dumping, especially when organized crime is involved, can be controlled simply by reporting incidents to the proper authorities. In the
first chapter, the authors introduce New Jersey State Police Detective
Sergeant Dirk Ottens and New York Police Officers William Grogan
and Stanley Greenberg, three of the noble figures in this book who
discovered, largely by chance, that organized crime figures dump toxic
waste. These men also learned
that their superiors, for whatever rea3
son, were not interested.
Chapter One identifies inadequate environmental regulations,
which are examined in later chapters, as ineffective in thwarting Mafia
infestation of the toxic waste disposal industry. The authors contend
that aside from technical problems in the regulations, regulatory and
law enforcement agencies are falsely optimistic about the regulatory
potential of environmental laws, and slow to acknowledge their abuse.
Government officials avoid countless difficulties merely by claiming
1. Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware and Director of
Research for the New York Senate Select Subcommittee on Crime since 1981.
2. Professor of Sociology at the University of Delaware and former President of the American Society of Criminology.
3. Grogan suspected that Yonkers city officials were collaborating with organized crime
figures, but his boss "was more a political cop than a professional one; promotions came to those
who did not investigate City Hall." P. 25.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:760

that the existing regulatory scheme is a "fully-found system that [will]
both regulate and control the toxic waste problem" (p. 19).
With that introduction, the book turns to the history of toxic waste
generation and regulation. Starting with asbestos problems in Ancient
Greece and lead poisoning in Rome, and shifting abruptly to the Industrial Revolution, the authors note that "[e]ach technological advance seemed to come accompanied by an unwanted toxic byproduct" (p. 36). In the twentieth century, with the introduction of
petrochemicals, the toxic waste problem exploded.4 Hazardous waste
generation continues to increase,5 and safe disposal methods remain
incapable of handling the total amount of waste generated. The result,
even without the participation of the Mafia, is an environmental crisis
manifested by disasters like Love Canal in Niagara Falls (pp. 39-43),
6
PCB-infested milk in Indiana (p. 38), and the "Valley of the Drums"
in Kentucky (p. 38).
Legislators, who began to confront environmental problems in the
early 1970s, were slow to recognize the hazardous waste dilemma.
Not until 1976 did the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) emerge as the
first federal legislation designed specifically to control hazardous waste
disposal. The authors focus their attention on RCRA, which they describe as "something of an EPA stepchild, languishing in unfulfilled
promises, never being permitted to reach its admittedly limited potential" (p. 58). Block and Scarpitti argue convincingly that RCRA
caused industries to shift from the traditional practice of disposing
toxic waste at their own facilities to the less expensive and potentially
more damaging practice of contracting with waste haulers to dispose
of toxic waste. Since RCRA regulated waste disposal rather than
waste generation, "generators soon learned to ask no questions about
the ultimate destination of their waste" (p. 60). Thus, RCRA unwittingly provided illegal dumpers, including organized crime, with the
opportunity to make large profits by undercutting legitimate disposal
enterprises and disposing of wastes on highways through open valves,
in fuel oil, and, most critical to the Mafia's involvement, in solid waste
4. The authors provide details of one disastrous incident - the Chemical Control fire in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, in 1980. Chemical Control started as a legitimate toxic waste treatment
facility that, when forcefully taken over by the Mafia, became a storage ground for thousands of
drums of toxic chemicals. As the situation worsened, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) finally took control of the site. Unfortunately, the drum inventory
actually increased during the time that the DEP's contractor was supposed to clean up the site,
and in September 1980 the site mysteriously caught fire. "If any number of... factors had been
slightly different, the Chemical Control fire might have become one of the nation's worst disasters, entirely manmade and completely avoidable." P. 250. Chapter Nine is devoted to the
"Chemical Control Nightmare."

5. "Within the decade of the 1970s alone, it is estimated that the production of toxic wastes
increased five times." P. 37. The authors do not document this figure.
6. The "Valley of the Drums" was a seven-acre site containing an estimated 17,000 improperly disposed drums of toxic chemicals.
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bound for solid waste landfills. 7
To Block and Scarpitti, Mafia involvement in hazardous waste disposal was predictable not only because of the potential for easy profit,8
but also because of the Mafia's existing, documented domination of the
solid waste disposal industry at the time RCRA was passed. The authors describe in detail the structure and operation of Mafia control
both of the disposal business, and of ancillary businesses such as loansharking. In addition, they discuss various state and federal investigations into activities of organized crime. 9 These investigations typically
led to convictions of major organized crime figures, but failed, according to the authors, to produce any "structural changes ...within the
waste industry" (p. 83). The reader begins to realize that one of the
keys to organized crime is that while no single individual involved in
organized crime is invincible, even extensive enforcement efforts leave
the system as a whole undaunted.
Another theme of the book, however, is that enforcement efforts
themselves are difficult to initiate and carry out effectively. To illustrate, Block and Scarpitti return to the experiences of Dirk Ottens and
introduce a new hero, John Fine, a former Manhattan district attorney
and member of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force.
Both Ottens and Fine encountered resistance from their superiors
when they presented evidence of organized crime involvement in the
hazardous waste disposal industry and requested permission to investigate further.10 When asked to testify before United States Senate hearings on organized crime, Ottens was accompanied by a high-ranking
official of the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice. The authors
describe the official's mission as one of "damage control" (p. 164):
The official ensured that the investigators did not ask questions that
would permit Ottens to reveal evidence of state government corruption or ineptitude. For his efforts in exposing Mafia involvement in
toxic waste dumping, Ottens was relieved of any further role in those
investigations. Fine, whose experience in New York was similar to
Ottens', was fired from his job with the Organized Crime Task Force.
Ottens and Fine, according to the authors, are not isolated examples, and "damage control" is a key element in state enforcement policy. Poisoning for Profit contains numerous anecdotes indicating
7. Pp. 60-62. The Mafia has an established domination of the solid waste disposal industry in
New York and New Jersey. The extent of this domination came to light largely as a result of
United States Senate investigations led by Senator John McClellan in the late 1950s. Pp. 68-75.
8. The authors characterize the Mafia not only in the traditional terms of "hierarchical structure, dependence upon violence, monopolistic control and influence, and immunity from the
law," but also, and more significantly, as an organization "which provides services that cannot be
supplied as efficiently or as cheaply by legitimate enterprises." P. 64.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Ottens' boss "virtually exploded" at the suggestion that the Mafia was involved in toxic
waste dumping. P. 143.
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complicity of state officials in the schemes of organized crime.II But
in addition to covering up corruption, damage control reflects the idea
that "[o]fficials in charge of city and state departments and agencies
are, of course, anxious to establish that they are not responsible, for
either past deaths and diseases or current and future disasters" (p.
197). In sum, say the authors, "[o]ne can never discount the complexities of law enforcement, and the fact that protection and exposure are
so often deeply wrapped in unknown interests and complex ambiguities" (p. 178).
The authors then turn to two perplexing questions. First, what is
the situation beyond New York and New Jersey? And second, what
legal mechanisms are appropriate and adequate to remedy the toxic
waste dilemma?
According to a survey of the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, sixteen states acknowledge a nexus between illegal toxic waste dumping and organized crime. Amazingly,
New York was not among those states, suggesting to the authors that
the survey underestimates the geographic scope of the problem. The
Permanent Subcommittee concluded that "[w]hile the solid waste industry is influenced by organized crime in many areas of the country,
... the same influence is not present in the hazardous waste industry"
(p. 280). Extrapolating from the situation in New York and New
Jersey, on the other hand, Block and Scarpitti perceive a problem national in scope. To bolster their argument, they note that the leading
national hazardous waste management industries - SCA Services,
Browning-Ferris, Waste Management - have all been linked with the
Mafia. The authors' evidence is considerably more tenuous in this section than in other sections of the book.
From a legal perspective, the main shortcoming of Poisoningfor
Profit is the authors' failure to analyze sufficiently the ineffectiveness of
enforcement initiatives and existing statutory efforts designed to curb
organized crime. Perhaps this genre of investigative journalism is inherently ill-equipped to provide for such an analysis; whatever the reason, the authors' simplistic conclusions warrant development.
The authors first attack the waste-manifesting system mandated by
RCRA under which all parties handling hazardous waste, from its
production to its ultimate disposal, must pass along an inventory of
the waste. Block and Scarpitti find the system ineffective because
quantities reported by generators are not matched with those reported
11. At one point, Ottens, who was investigating illegal dumping by Duane Marine Salvage
Corporation, found a copy of an affidavit he had submitted in confidence to a state judge in the
files "of a notorious toxic waste dumper and organized crime figure ..
" P. 147. The affidavit
contained the name of one of Ottens' informants, and the judge had assured Ottens that the
document would be kept private. In addition, "the business agent for Duane Marine Salvage
Corporation... had a brother who was the chief of investigators for the Division of Criminal
Justice." P. 141.
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as properly disposed. "The system would only work to deter lawbreakers as long as the principals believed someone, somewhere,
would check" (p. 313). Moreover, RCRA's requirement that waste
generators, transporters, treaters, storers, and dump operators obtain
operating permits is easily circumvented (p. 57). As the authors rec.ognize, permits are freely granted, even to organized crime figures.
Unfortunately, the authors fail to discuss possible regulatory strategies
for denying permits to members of organized crime.
In the final chapter of Poisoningfor Profit, the authors take a curious diversion into the failures of the Reagan Administration's EPA.
While this is certainly an interesting topic in its own right, here it
serves only as a distraction bearing little relation to the rest of the
book. They note that the Reagan EPA has conveyed the message that
"[i]ndustry did not have much to worry about from an administration
that did not plan to enforce the law" (p. 319), at a time when federal
environmental investigators need more enforcement power and better
coordination with state and federal justice departments. The authors
call for increased federal involvement in enforcement, reiterating the
contention, unpopular in the Reagan Administration, that states have
proven themselves prone to ineptitude and corruption. They add that
federal involvement is also appropriate because hazardous waste
dumping is an interstate problem, in that hazardous waste from one
state is often transported for disposal in another.
The authors also suggest that the public curb consumption of
goods whose production yields toxic by-products. However, they offer
no legal incentives to discourage consumption, undoubtedly because
American law is generally averse to major incursions into individual
lifestyles and freedom of choice. Do the authors really expect the public to boycott styrofoam hamburger containers in response to the invisible threat of toxic wastes? Block and Scarpitti's proposal seems
naively idealistic.
Finally, the authors suggest reform in environmental statutes and
in the use of existing criminal statutes designed to curb organized
crime. In most states, illegal dumping and other environmental statute violations are misdemeanors afforded low enforcement priority (p.
331). If convicted, violators are often treated as white-collar
criminals, and the fines imposed fall far short of the probable profits
they make through illegal disposal. The authors suggest that in addition to imposing harsher penalties on toxic waste dumpers, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) be employed
to deter organized crime's involvement in the practice. Unfortunately,
the book's discussion of RICO lasts less than a page (pp. 338-39), the
authors merely noting the stricter penalties imposed by the statute.
They also shortchange the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which imposes liability
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on a broader range of defendants than does RCRA. The authors refer
to CERCLA early in the book (pp. 59-60) but fail to mention it when
discussing potential solutions in the final chapter.
The mass of evidence revealed in Poisoningfor Profit sounds an
alarm bell, because whatever the involvement of the Mafia in illegal
disposal of hazardous waste, the potential consequences to the public
welfare are disastrous. The authors' readable journalistic style and
persuasive evidence are the book's strengths. Much of their argument
emerges gradually through the anecdotal strands, most involving a
dedicated law enforcer pitted against corrupt or inept government officials and organized crime figures, that appear and reappear throughout the book. In addition, Block and Scarpitti have amassed an
impressive network of sources, some providing information from
within the clutches of organized crime. Some reviewers have criticized
the authors' investigatory techniques and their unquestioning reliance
on the credibility of their contacts.12 Nonetheless, the sheer bulk and
logical organization of the evidence yield the convincing conclusion
that, at least in New York and New Jersey, organized crime is involved routinely in illegal toxic waste dumping. Block and Scarpitti
have made an important contribution - if Poisoningfor Profit is taken
seriously by legal scholars capable of developing a more solution-oriented approach to the problem the authors identify.
Geoffrey Garver
12. See, eg., Martens, Martens' Comments on Scarpitti and Block, ACJS TODAY, Sept. 1985,
at 3. Martens, a member of the New Jersey State Police, challenges the authors' conclusion
linking the Mafia to toxic waste dumping. Such a reaction from a state law enforcement officer
fits soundly into Block and Scarpitti's damage control theory.

